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Full
text of presentation:
The
debate: 'This
house believes that we need more coercive testing and treatment services'
Speech in opposition by Dr Judith Rumgay, London School of Economics
> Link to additional
article: FAITH IN FORCE: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON
COERCED DRUG TREATMENT
- I come from a background
in the probation service and my research emphasises offender rehabilitation,
rather than drug treatment. My remarks will undoubtedly reflect that
background. I am not against coercion in drug treatment per se.
Changing the lifestyles of serous and recidivist drug using offenders
is a challenging undertaking and there is no doubt that coercion, applied
with discrimination in reflective practice, can be a helpful tool in
persuading offenders to engage in that process.
- What I am objecting
to here is the word ‘more’ in this motion. I have four grounds for my
objection:-
- Firstly, we have
already witnessed a steady encroachment of penal priorities into the
field of drug treatment over the past decade. This drift carries with
it the risk of becoming reliant on coercion, enforcement and punishment
as the primary means by which to alter offenders’ behaviour. We can
see this growing reliance most clearly in the introduction of Abstinence
Orders, in which the provision of treatment to assist the process of
withdrawing from a drug using lifestyle is apparently superfluous. Yet,
we do not need to experiment with prioritising enforcement over treatment
in intensive supervision programmes to know what the result will be.
As long ago as the early 1990s, the Americans demonstrated, very clearly,
that intensive surveillance and enforcement in supervision does not
yield positive results except when these activities are accompanied
by high quality treatment provision. Absent this, these methods become
a means of clogging the penal system with offenders who are unable to
comply with the strict behavioural requirements of supervision, leaving
diminished resources for effective control of those whose offending
itself presents high risk.
- Secondly, the expansion
of coerced intensive supervision of offenders in the community during
the 1990s up to the present time is not matched by any reduction in
the use of imprisonment. Rather, for the past 15 years, there has been
a steady decline in the seriousness of the probation community supervision
caseload, which can be measured by the numbers of offenders placed on
community orders with previous experience of imprisonment and the numbers
without previous convictions. Fewer offenders now placed on community
supervision have previous convictions and fewer have already served
a custodial sentence than 15 years ago. Put simply, increasingly intrusive
and coercive forms of supervision are being visited upon a caseload
of decreasing seriousness. Thus, the costs of increased technological
surveillance and of enforcement of supervision have not been offset
by a corresponding decline in the use of imprisonment. For all our innovation,
we remain the European Union’s leader in the imprisonment. It is difficult
to comprehend how this can be justified as an exercise in enhanced public
protection.
- Thirdly, all this
expansion of coerced treatment, with its accompanying costs, has taken
place with little thought as to whether we are making good enough use
of the existing mainstream treatment opportunities. An attraction of
the coercive approach arose from early American evaluations that found
an association between coercion and time spent in treatment. Time spent
in treatment is itself associated with successful outcome. It was all
too easy to conclude that ‘coercion works’. Wrong – it is engagement
with treatment that works. The very high drop out and breach rates of
DTTOs and all the effective practice pathfinder programmes demonstrate
the damaging naïveté of privileging coercion over engagement,
- NTORS, which was
notable for its evaluation of common mainstream drug services, rather
than of new, experimental and limited innovations, demonstrated that
these relatively modest community services can assist in the reduction
of offending even though that that is not generally an explicit focus
of their treatment strategies. Perhaps we should be seeking ways to
encourage offenders to utilise community drug services more effectively,
rather than generating more specialised programmes specifically for
them. Indeed, the proliferation of specific offender programmes, in
the context of general resource scarcity, is potentially discriminatory
and divisive in communities overburdened with drug problems.
- Finally, the expansion
of coerced surveillance and treatment has a marked tendency to operate
indiscriminately. We need only re-examine the wording of the motion
to realise this potential for indiscriminate entrapment of individuals
in criminalising processes. For, although I have limited my response
to a discussion of its implications for offenders, the motion does not
actually limit itself to any particular target population for the attentions
of these new coercive interventions. It merely asks for ‘more’ of them.
TOP
FAITH
IN FORCE: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON COERCED DRUG TREATMENT
Judith
Rumgay, London School of Economics
We have witnessed
a steady encroachment of penal priorities into the field of drug treatment
over the past decade. Since the Criminal Justice Act 1991, there has been
a range of residential and non-residential treatment requirements available
for insertion into probation orders. The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 introduced
the Drug Treatment and Testing Order (DTTO), modelled on the American
Drug Court initiatives, which broke new ground in mandating for compulsory
drug testing, with regular court oversight of treatment progress. This
drift towards coerced treatment carries with it the risk of becoming reliant
on coercion, enforcement and punishment as the primary means by which
to alter offenders' behaviour. The DTTO legislation, indeed, explicitly
relegated the role of the probation officer to monitoring, enforcing and
reporting progress to the court. We can see this growing reliance on coercion
most clearly in the introduction of Abstinence Orders, in which the provision
of treatment to assist the process of withdrawing from a drug-using lifestyle
is apparently deemed superfluous.
Yet, we do not need
to experiment with prioritising enforcement over treatment in intensive
supervision programmes to know what the result will be. As long ago as
the early 1990s, the Americans demonstrated, very clearly, that intensive
surveillance and enforcement in supervision does not yield positive
results except when these activities are accompanied by high quality
treatment provision (Clear and Hardyman 1990; Petersilia and Turner 1990).
Absent this, these methods become a means of clogging the penal system
with offenders who are unable to comply with the strict behavioural requirements
of supervision, leaving diminished resources for effective control of
those whose offending itself presents high risk (Petersilia 1999).
Moreover, in the UK,
the steady expansion of coerced intensive supervision of offenders in
the community during the 1990s up to the present time is not explained
by any reduction in the use of imprisonment. Rather, for the past 15 years,
there has been a steady decline in the seriousness of the Probation Service's
community supervision caseload, which can be measured by the numbers of
offenders placed on community orders with previous experience of imprisonment
and the numbers without previous convictions. Put simply, increasingly
intrusive and coercive forms of supervision are being visited upon a caseload
of decreasing seriousness (see Home Office 2004 for statistical evidence
on this point). It is difficult to comprehend how this can be justified
as an exercise in enhanced public protection.
All of this expansion
of coerced treatment, with its accompanying costs, has taken place with
little thought as to whether we are making good enough use of the existing
mainstream treatment opportunities. An attraction of the coercive approach
arose from early American evaluations that found a positive association
between coercion and length of time spent in treatment. Time spent in
treatment is itself associated with successful outcomes (Gottfredson,
Najaka and Kearley 2003). It has been all too easy to conclude from this
that 'coercion works'. This superficial interpretation is simply wrong:
it is engagement with treatment that works. The very high drop
out and breach rates of DTTOs demonstrate the damaging naïveté
of privileging coercion over engagement (Turnbull et al 2000).
NTORS, which was notable
for its evaluation of mainstream drug services, rather than of new, experimental
and limited innovations, demonstrated that these relatively modest community
support services can assist in the reduction of offending even though
that is not generally an explicit focus of their treatment strategies
(Gossop et al 2003). Perhaps we should be seeking ways to encourage
offenders to utilise community drug services more effectively, rather
than generating more specialised programmes specifically for them. Indeed,
the proliferation of specific offender programmes, in the context of general
resource scarcity, is potentially discriminatory and divisive in communities
overburdened with drug problems (Rumgay 2001).
Changing the lifestyles
of serous and recidivist drug-using offenders is a challenging undertaking.
Certainly, coercion, when applied with discrimination in the context of
holistic and reflective practice, can be a helpful tool in persuading
some offenders to engage in that process. However, the ease with which
we are seduced into indiscriminate reliance upon coercion as our primary
vehicle for enforcing behavioural change testifies to our reluctance to
acknowledge the complex social and personal difficulties that characterise
the lifestyles of drug-using offenders.
References
Clear, T.R. and Hardyman, P.L. (1990) 'The New Intensive Supervision Movement.'
Crime and Delinquency, 36(1): 42-60.
Gossop, M., Marsden, J., Stewart, D. and Kidd, T. (2003) 'The National
Treatment Outcome Research Study (NTORS): 4-5 Year Follow-up Results.'
Addiction, 98: 291-303.
Gottfredson, D.C., Najaka, S.S. and Kearley, B. (2003) 'Effectiveness
of Drug Treatment Courts: Evidence from a Randomized Trial.' Criminology
and Public Policy, 2(2): 171-196.
Home Office (2004) Probation Statistics England and Wales 2002.
London: Home
Office.
Petersilia, J. (1999) 'Alternative Sanctions: Diverting Nonviolent Prisoners
to Intermediate Sanctions: The Impact on Prison Admissions and Corrections
Costs.' In E.L. Rubin (ed) Minimizing Harm: A New Crime Policy for
Modern America. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Pp. 115-49.
Petersilia, J. and Turner, S. (1990) 'Comparing Intensive and Regular
Supervision for High-Risk Probationers: Early Results from an Experiment
in California.' Crime and Delinquency, 36(1): 87-111.
Rumgay, J. (2001) 'Accountability in the Delivery of Community Penalties:
To Whom, For What and Why?' In A. Bottoms, L. Gelsthorpe and S. Rex (eds)
Community Penalties: Change and Challenges. Cullompton, Willan,
pp. 126-45.
Turnbull, P.J., McSweeney, T., Webster, R., Edmunds, M. and Hough, M.
(2000) Drug Treatment and Testing Orders: Final Evaluation Report.
Home Office Research Study 212. London: Home Office.
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